In the recent years, with a globally increasing private motoring, tunnelling has gained a particular importance. After a series of dramatic accidents, the public opinion has turned its attention to tunnel fire safety. This paper focuses on the risk analysis in road tunnels, using the well-established Europe PIARC-OECD Quantitative Risk Assessment Model (QRAM). In the first part, a brief literature review -also on forensic investigations in tunnelsis performed, and the logic behind this method is briefly reassumed, focusing on the risk indicators. In the second part, a comprehensive risk analysis is performed in a long tunnel in Southern Italy, accounting for multifaceted aspects and parameters. The paper is completed with a sensitivity analysis on specific parameters that have an influence on the risk.
Introduction
The problem of fire safety in the recent years has gained a predominant role in the civil engineering design practice. This is because nowadays always bigger and more complex structures are designed and build, making use of particularly fire sensitive materials such as steel, and also because there is an increasing belief that structures not only have to resist to the design loads, but also have to maintain a minimal performance in accidental situations. The necessity to pursue these goals has led to the growth of the branch of fire safety engineering, and, in particular, of fire risk assessment methods.
The above considerations are even more valid for tunnels, due to the complexity of establishing such structures. In fact, tunnels and underground structures are becoming more and more essential these days, when installing new infrastructure in congested areas as well as when raising the qualities within the existing urbanisations. The realisation of such structures calls for specific measures regarding durability provisions, commitment to environmental aspects, issues of sustainability and safety assurance. Furthermore, fire safety in tunnels is challenging because of the particular environment.
An additional aspect is that tunnels built years ago will not satisfy new fire safety requirements. Thus, plans for upgrading fire safety provisions and tunnel management need to be developed and implemented for existing tunnels.
Over the last 20 years, there has been an increase in the building of both road and rail tunnel. Europe, in particular, not only has some of the world's longest tunnels in operation, but many more are under construction. The Brenner base railway tunnel (55 km) and the Mont d'Ambin base railway tunnel (57 km) are two noteworthy examples.
On the other hand, once more with reference only in Europe, over the period of just two years, some notable disasters brought the problem of tunnel fire safety in evidence (Carvel and Marlair, 2005) : Added to this human tragedy is the damage to the tunnel structures and installations and the service disruption, with significant economic consequences. The Great Belt (during construction) and Channel Tunnel fires (three fires, the last occurring in 2008, were significant enough to close the tunnel) while resulting in no loss of life have nevertheless caused major structural damage and financial loss.
That said, nowadays, tunnel risk management is mandatory by most codes and standards. In fact, since 2004, the European Directive (Directive 2004 /54/EC, 2004 calls for the implementation of risk reduction measures and independent risk analysis. Risk management is directly linked with forensic investigations, which performed in the aftermath of disasters or construction failures. Regarding the latter, in tunnel structures, forensic investigations focus mainly in geotechnical issues and uncertainties (see, for example, Lee and Ishihara, 2011; Yusheng et al., 2014) . Delatte (2009) and Delatte and Bosela (2015) report several cases, including the Boston Big Dig tunnel ceiling failure (NTSB, 2007) .
This study focuses on the quantitative risk assessment of road tunnels using Quantitative Risk Assessment Model (QRAM). QRAM is a tool created with the cooperation of OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), PIARC (World Road Association) and the European Commission, whose purpose is to calculate the risk related to road traffic of heavy good vehicles. In fact, heavy vehicles circulation in case of accident, especially for dangerous goods, implies an additional risk to road users, to nearby facilities, to the local population and to the environment (PIARC-OECD, 2001 ). Therefore, through a Quantitative Risk Analysis, the competent authorities may assess whether to allow the transition of all types of goods through a given corridor. To help the authorities in this choice, with particular attention to the high extension galleries, the PIARC and the OECD developed QRAM. This model uses risk assessment methodologies implemented in the past in the chemical and nuclear industry, considering also that accidents in these fields, even though rare, can have major consequences (PIARC Technical Committee C3.3, 2008; Vagiokas et al., 2013) .
QRAM is extensively used in Europe, and is included in many national standards, among else, in Austria, Greece, and Slovenia (see DG MOVE [2014] and Diernhofer [2010] , for an application in Austria).
Research with QRAM is vast and ongoing (see, for example, Nathanail et al., 2010) , including combined implementations with other methods. Petelin et al. (2010) implement QRAM together with CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamic) models on a long road tunnel. Kazaras et al. (2013) propose a fuzzy logic system based in order to provide more sophisticated estimations of the tunnel operator's performance in safety critical situations, by coupling the results produced by a fuzzy logic system with the input parameters QRAM. Their results reveal that the estimations of the tunnel operator's performance produced by the fuzzy system significant affect the results of the road tunnel QRA (Quantified Risk Analysis).
In the rest of the paper, Section 1 deals with some preliminary risk analysis aspects for the procedure, Section 2 describes the procedure by QRAM and Section 3 focuses on the risk assessment of a real, long road tunnel in Southern Italy.
Risk analysis aspects and implementation procedure
In general, risk is given by:
where P is probability of occurrence of a given event, and C is the relative consequence which can be measured in number of fatalities, injuries, cost of the structure damage caused by the event and damage to the environment. In this study, consequence C refers to the number of victims N. Furthermore, the risk can be social or individual. The Societal Risk (SR) can be defined as the risk to which it is subjected a group of people in case occurs a scenario s. It is expressed as the relationship between the probability of a catastrophic incident, expressed as the average frequency with which it can be expected to occur, and its consequences:
where F(N) is the cumulative frequency [1/year] of an event that causes a number of victims ≥ N (i.e. cumulative frequency), and N the number of fatalities [Fat] . The SR is represented through F-N diagrams and Expected Values of victims (EVs). The F-N diagrams may be applied to illustrate the risk profile from a hazardous activity such as the transportation of dangerous goods in a road tunnel. On the x-axis is shown in logarithmic scale the number of victims N, and on the y-axis, on a logarithmic scale as well, the corresponding annual rate F(N) with which events occur that cause a number of victims higher or equal to N (see Figure 1) .
The expected value (EV), which is the expected amount of victims in a certain time period, can be calculated as the area under the F-N curve by using the following equation (Petelin et al., 2010 ):
where EVs is the expected value of victims in one year caused by the scenario s, f s,N is the frequency of an accident with N fatalities [1/year].
The individual risk can be expressed as an annual frequency [1/year] or as the time interval between two accidents that cause the same fatalities among the local population because of an accident on the road network. Considering an accident scenario s, it indicates the probability (in one year) that an individual, located at some distance from the road network, dies. The number of people exposed to the incident does not affect the value of the risk, thus, for this reason, it is called 'individual'. It can be represented as the risk distribution in the space surrounding the road section through a 2D map. The risk assessment procedure consists of different steps. In a first phase data need to be collected. For the case of a road route analysis, traffic data, accident frequencies, meteorological conditions, tunnel equipment (in presence of a tunnel), etc., are necessary. Next, there is the risk analysis phase, in which the risk indicators, through a quantitative model, such as the QRAM, are calculated. In the final step, an assessment is necessary of whether the risk indicator value obtained with the analysis is acceptable or not. If the level of risk is not acceptable, it is necessary to provide for measures risk mitigation, which can be of prevention if they reduce the frequency of occurrence of accidents, or of protection if they act on the protection provided to users once a scenario has occurred.
In literature, there are several methods to evaluate the risk level, some of which are based on the 'absolute criterion' of risk acceptability and others on the 'relative criterion'. In this study, the absolute criterion is used. The absolute criterion allows to identify the minimum level safety that must be guaranteed for road users.
Among the most common principles is the one of ALARP. ALARP stands for 'As Low as Reasonably Practicable'. It is used to make decisions about the significance of risks and whether each specific risk should be accepted or treated (Melchers, 1993; HSE, 1992) .
The 'ALARP region' lies between unacceptably high and negligible risk levels ( Figure 2 ). The width of the 'V' represents the level of risk. The area between the two levels, where costs and benefits are traded off in the risk evaluation process, indicates the ALARP region. Risks below the ALARP region are of negligible level, while risks above the ALARP region are intolerable. Relevant considerations are made in Gkoumas (2008) . Starting from the ALARP criterion, tunnel safety can be expressed in terms of societal risk, usually expressed in terms of frequency versus number of fatalities (FN) curves (a comprehensive overview for road accidents is given in Evans, 2003) . At this point, an upper value has to be set, that is either project specific or arises from national regulations.
Considering the above, and with reference to Figure 1 , the F-N plane is divided into three zones: not acceptable risk area, acceptable risk area and ALARP area (prevention and/or mitigation actions must be taken to reduce the risk, as far as reasonably practicable). In fact, if the curve is between the two lines, then measures for risk reduction should be taken, but the operations costs must not be disproportionate to the benefits obtained in risk reduction. So, a cost-benefit analysis is needed.
Several other methods for risk acceptance criteria exist. Among those, the precautionary principle is frequently used, originally formulated in the context of environmental protection, and defined in UNCED AGENDA 21 (1992) as follows: 'where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent degradation'.
Risk acceptance criteria for road tunnels are provided in Holický (2007) in terms of individual risk (i.e. a person related to specific operational conditions), expected risk (i.e. number of fatalities per tunnel and year) and societal risk (i.e. number of fatalities exceeding a given number per tunnel or 1 km of a tunnel and year).
In order to reduce risk, several measures can be foreseen, on the basis of how much should be invested in safety for a given activity. To this aim, a decision analysis may be performed by considering the expected total benefit associated with the considered activity (Faber and Stewart, 2003) .
Technology is nowadays fully implemented for risk reduction purposes, perceived as the diminishment of the probability or severity of the adverse effects. The appropriate use of this information can lead to the reduction of the risk of occurrence of adverse events, or limit their consequences (Bontempi et al., 2005) . As an example, with reference to a highway link and the occurrence of a traffic accident, there can be identified three parallel event-time zones before and after the accident occurrence: 1 the actual events that take place inside the tunnel; 2 the monitoring of the events of the previous zone; and 3 the corresponding response of the system.
In Figure 3 , a limited in time sector of the zones is shown, related to what takes place shortly before and after a highway accident. This classification is not new to a system approach to fire safety and similar concepts can be found in literature. For example, Brussaard et al. (2004) identify five phases, within a specific framework which considers the occurrence and development of road tunnel accidents. Cigada et al. (2005) discuss risk reduction methods for tunnels using recent technology, with a case study in a rail tunnel, while Liu et al. (2011) investigate on the performance of fire detection equipment.
Combination of QRAM and scenario-based analysis
The analysis carried out by the QRAM is at a macroscopic level. In fact, it is possible to set some of the parameters that characterise the various scenarios. To describe the evolution of the physical phenomenon, the developers of QRAM have used simplified models whose results (obtained for different possible evolutions of the phenomenon) were included in contingency tables. Consequently, QRAM uses during the analysis data provided by the final user, together with those that it picks up from the tables, to calculate risk indicators (Figure 4 ). 
Quantitative Risk Estimation
Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of risk mitigation measures on the specific scenario, because it is not possible to evaluate changes that occur in the evolution of the physical phenomenon. For example, in case of fire in a tunnel, it is complicated to know how the flow of gasses changes if it is decided to use a transverse ventilation system characterised by dynamic dampers for the fumes extraction. In the same way, in order to evacuate toxic gases, it is impossible to understand if opening a damper, instead of another, could modify and in which way the evolution of the whole scenario.
Considering the above, it is convenient to combine the QRAM with CFD simulations and evacuation models (Baroncelli et al. [2015] perform a CFD analysis on the case study tunnel of Section 3). An operating method to follow can be to identify the critical scenarios that give the most significant contribution to the overall risk through the QRAM, and then to simulate those scenarios in detail in order to define risk reduction measures.
The procedure followed by the model to calculate SR indicators (i.e. F-N curves and EVs) is reported in Figure 5 .  Pressure Effects (the shock wave generated by the explosion): these are caused by the pressure wave generated by an explosion, which propagates outward from the epicentre. When the wave front arrives at a certain space point, the overpressure increases instantly from zero to its peak value and immediately after decreases. Therefore, the overpressure drops to zero in a short time, and this marks the end of the positive phase. The physical parameters used to represent the effects of pressure on people are the peak overpressure ∆P s [bar] , and the positive phase duration
 Toxic Effects (poisoning due to the release of toxic substances): these consist in the poisoning of users due to the exposure to a particular toxic substance. In order to define the level of poisoning of an individual, the concentration of the toxic substance in question in the air and the time of exposure to that particular concentration C [ppmv] are considered.
With the aid of specific models, QRAM establishes the relationship between the singleeffect and the distance from the epicentre of the incident. At this point, through a probit analysis, the model derives the relationship between the mortality rate (probability of dying occupying a certain position in relation to the incident) and the distance from the centre of the incident (Figure 7 ). The probit analysis is a type of regression used for analysing the relationship between a stimulus (dose) and 'all or nothing' (such as death) response. This method was proposed initially by Finney (1971) . Exposing biological organisms' population to a number of different doses of a toxic substance, Finney plotted a Gaussian curve for each experience and the complete dose-response curve using the cumulative mean response at each dose. For convenience, he plotted the response versus the logarithm of the dose, because this form provides a 'flatter' line in the middle of the curve. In general, these curves can be drawn for different exposures, including heat, pressure, radiation, and toxic gases. However, for computational purposes, the response-dose curve is not convenient, so Finney developed a method to provide a straight-line equivalent to the response-dose curve, by establishing a relationship between the probability P that an individual dies under a given dose (i.e. lethality percentage) and the probit variable Pr (PROBability unIT):
  Plotting the Pr -log (dose) curve using a linear probit scale, therefore, it is possible to transform the sigmoid shape of the normal response versus dose curve into a straight line (Figure 8) . In a QRAM, the probit variable Pr is computed from:
where D is the load related to the single effect (dose), a and b are probit parameters, the values of which depend on the effect considered. In the calculation of the mortality rate for increasing distances from the point of the accident, the model also accounts for the possibility of escape or of finding shelter, calculating the total dose of a given effect that affects a subject during the escape. This is done by calculating the effective dose D j that affects a road user:
where t is the minimum time between the duration of the scenario t s and the time necessary for the user to evacuate the area t evac .
Figure 8
Response versus log dose curve (left), relationship between percentages and probits (centre) and the transformation that converts the sigmoidal response versus log dose curve into a straight line (right) from Crowl and Louvar (2011) After that, the model derives the frequency of occurrence of each scenario once an accident involving HGV without dangerous goods (20 MW and 100 MW Fires) or DG-HGV has occurred. For example, for scenarios involving DG-HGV:
where f ijk is the frequency of occurrence of the scenario j (involving DG of type k) on the section i in a year, P ijk is the conditional probability that scenario j occurs once the accident has taken place, f acc_DG,i is the annual frequency of accidents involving DGHGVs [acc/(MVkm*year)] and TD ik is the traffic of DG-HGVs of type k passing through section i in one hour. Regarding the P ij values, these are automatically fetched from precompiled tables by the software (these are precompiled values obtained by a Fault Tree Analysis). At this point, the model calculates the number of victims associated with a scenario s, considering as the main parameter the user density per linear meter of the road section ( Figure 9 ). This density has a different value depending on whether you are considering a portion occupied by traffic jam, or a portion characterised by fluid traffic. For example, the number of victims among road users in a traffic jam is given by the following expression: -] . Finally, the model considers that each scenario s may appear as a different event E i , by varying some parameters, such as the section of the considered path, the accident location on the section, the traffic direction, the reference period of the day (e.g. peakhour traffic period), etc. Thus, QRAM computes a different number of victims N i for each one of these events E i , and associates a probability of occurrence f i to each one of them. From these frequencies, it calculates the cumulative frequencies F i . Therefore, associating with each possible number of victims (N i ) the corresponding cumulative frequency (F i ), in the case where N n < … < N 4 < N 3 < N 2 < N 1 , it is possible to draw the risk curve on the F-N plane (Table 1) . 
Figure 9 Number of fatalities calculation
The model allows to make a risk assessment in a road route along which there are one or more tunnels. It is also possible to obtain the intrinsic risk of a tunnel, modelling the tunnel separately from the route where it is inserted. In both cases, the risk indicators are calculated considering the main characteristics of:
 the road route (total length, etc.);  the platform road (number of lanes, etc.);  the tunnel (cross-sectional area, etc.);  its safety equipment (system ventilation, drainage system, by pass, etc.); and  the type of traffic (total traffic, heavy vehicles, dangerous goods, etc.). Therefore, the model, during the analysis, considers different aspects of road transport and up to 13 possible accident scenarios, and, consequently, the resulting risk assessment is at a macroscopic level, i.e. the model refers to the entire transport system.
Analysis on a real tunnel structure
This section deals with the risk analysis on an operational road tunnel in southern Italy, the San Demetrio Tunnel (galleria San Demetrio).
Description of the infrastructure and modelling aspects
The Being the structure characterised by a fire resistance class, according to the EN 13501-2, of REI120, in the analyses a value of 120 minutes under fire has been considered before the structure loses its mechanical strength, the seal to flames and hot gases and the heat insulation. The temperature, under which the structure withstands for this time interval, has been assumed to be 1350°C. Following the instructions provided in the QRA manual, for a double-bore tunnel with one-direction traffic, at least three sections are needed to form the model (Figure 11 ).
In case of accident, evacuating people can use one of nine pedestrian bypasses arranged every 300 m that lead to the parallel tube, which serves as an escape route.
The tunnel is equipped with a longitudinal ventilation system consisting of 18 southbound jet fans and 19 northbound jet fans. After the location of the fire is identified, a ventilation system is activated either automatically or by the controller at the control centre. The ventilation system pushes the air with an average speed (on the cross-section) of 3 m/s in the direction of traffic, freeing the route upstream of the incident from the toxic fumes, facilitating in this way the evacuation. For the representation of the firereaction system behaviour, it is assumed a time of fire detection (via thermo sensitive cables) of 3 minutes from the ignition, and a further time of 5 minutes for the emergency ventilation establishment. NORTH (Catania) x Therefore, QRAM considers only a system of longitudinal ventilation, where the volume flow of extracted air by each segment has been set equal to 0. Equally, regarding the airflow along the tunnel, it is assumed (in normal operating conditions) as 0. With this choice, it is assumed that the axial fans only come into operation in case of emergency, and that the piston effect due to the vehicular traffic and to the pressure difference at the portals is ignored.
When a fire is detected, jet fans start working at full capacity after 5 minutes from the detection. These accelerate the air with an average speed along the tunnel of 3 m/s, and the volume of the airflow moved at each node is equal to: 
Regarding the ventilation, a positive sign has been given to the flow in the southerly direction (+261 m 3 /s) and a negative sign in the northern direction (-261 m 3 /s). In fact, the airflow must follow the direction of the vehicles, which, in accordance with the modelling decisions, is +1 southbound and -1 northbound.
In case of an emergency in the tunnel, the alarm is given automatically using CO sensors, opacimeters, linear thermal sensors (heat sensing cable) and a system of CCTV cameras, on which an automatic AVID (Automatic Video-based Incident Detection) software has been installed, which detects the presence of flames along the tunnel. Therefore, the model considers for the emergency management systems, a maximum level of allocations for communication and control over people evacuating. According to this level of equipment, the tunnel must be equipped with at least a PA system (Public Address system) and a CCTV cameras system. Regarding the first, there is no exact information on the presence or not of such a system. However, since the tunnel has, in addition to the CCTV system, other provisions for the emergencies resolution, it was decided in any case to give the maximum mark on safety equipment that limits the number of victims.
Traffic data (Table 2) were provided by an engineering company (Impresa Pizzarotti & C. S.p.A., 2007) . For each direction of travel, the Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) is 21,190 [veh/day] . The daily distribution of traffic is divided into three time periods: QUIET, that corresponds at nine night hours with a traffic, NORMAL, corresponding to ten hours of quiet daytime period and PEAK. The same table provides additional data on the DG-HGV traffic and the average vehicle speed. Figure 12 reports the percentage of each type of hazardous goods, compared to the total traffic of dangerous goods. The accident rate involving HVGs was taken for the year 2027: 0.161 acc/(MVkm*year) in direction SOUTH, and 0.160 acc/(MVkm*year) in direction NORTH.
Quantitative risk analysis outcomes
This section reports the F-N curve in the south direction and its expected value EV ( Figure 13 ). For practical reasons, it was decided to show only the cumulative curve of all scenarios. This is also because, for the purposes of risk assessment, it is interesting to assess the risk due to all types of dangerous goods that pass through the tunnel. As can be seen in the graph, the curve falls within the ALARP region. Being away from the tolerable risk line, the tunnel can be considered as safe; however, possible risk mitigation measures should be taken into consideration, measures that will be taken only after a cost-benefit analysis, necessary to verify the economic consistency of operations compared to the reduction of risk pursued.
Considering the above, it was decided to study how the societal risk varies changing an input parameter at a time. This leads to a better understanding on what data influence more in the risk calculation using the QRAM. Moreover, since the changes on the input variables have produced similar results in both directions, it was decided to report only the diagram relating to the south direction ( Figure 14) . In what follows, and for the sake of brevity, only four of the more interesting cases are reported.
In the first case, the accidents frequency involving HGVs is increased and decreased by a factor of 10 ( Figure 15 ). This variation leads to a vertical translation of the risk curve, towards higher and lower cumulative frequencies, in direct proportion to the changes made to the initial values. These results can be easily interpreted considering that the frequency of occurrence of each scenario depends directly on the value of the incidental frequencies.
In the second case, the time necessary to block incoming traffic in the tunnel in case of emergency is varied (Figure 16 ). The curves show that after 5 minutes from the occurrence of any accident scenario, no risk reduction is possible, even if the incoming traffic is deviated. This is because the model, in calculating the number of victims, considers as the main parameter the linear density of users on the considered road section. This value depends mainly on the traffic jam length upstream of the accident, which, apparently, is formed in the first 5 minutes following the occurrence of the scenario.
In the third case, the number of lanes varies (Figure 17 ): increasing the number of lanes, the curve moves to a higher number of victims. In fact, increasing this number also increases the density of users in the area occupied by the traffic jam.
In the fourth case, the LPG traffic composition varies, from vehicles equipped with tanks in vehicles carrying such DGs in cylinders (Figure 18 ). This variation results in a significant reduction of risk, since the model assumes that, in case of an accident, it is possible at maximum the breach of two cylinders simultaneously. This leads to an explosion that causes a number of victims lower compared to the explosion that is generated after the rupture of a LPG tank. 
